What Matters – Size, Membership or Mobilization? 
Analyzing the Factors that Contribute to the Success or Failure of Ethnic Minority Parties – A Comparative Case Study of Albania and Bulgaria

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Abstract: The aim of this article is to examine which factors contribute towards the success or its lack of an ethnic minority political party. With a comparative case study of two countries - Albania and Bulgaria, and by implementing the most similar case design (Mill’s method of difference), we test two hypotheses. Mainly, the focus is on EU membership and the size and mobilization practices of the ethnic minority i.e. whether these factors where the countries differ, have determined the position of the ethnic minority parties within the respective countries. The results defy the commonly applied theory that the institutional arrangement of the political and electoral system determines the likelihood of success for each political party, including the political parties of the ethnic minorities. In the case of the ethnic Greek parties in Albania, the constitutional ban took a toll on their success rates, while the party of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria managed to surpass it. The differing outcomes of the ethnic minority parties in both countries where the institutional arrangement is similar, calls for further research on potential intervening and antecedent variables, such as the international position of the country in question, the size of the ethnic minority, and the mobilization capacities of the party which represents them.

Key words: Albania, Bulgaria, Ethnicity, Minority, Parties
Introduction

In terms of electoral votes, the ethnic minority political parties have succeeded and failed in different environments. In Bulgaria and Albania, ethnic political parties are essentially banned (Juberias 2000:37) Both countries have created an unfriendly environment for ethnic minority parties by imposing constitutional bans on parties based on ethnicity, as well as by providing a neutral electoral system with electoral rules which treat all parties (large and small), equally, with an electoral threshold of 4 and 3 % respectively. In the case of Albania, the parties representing the Greek minority have experienced a gradual decrease of its electoral votes over the years, along with a gradual decrease of citizens who have declared themselves as ethnic Greeks in performed censuses over the years. Bulgaria on the other hand, is a case where the party which informally represents the ethnic Turks, managed to surpass the constitutional and electoral barriers and gained an increasing electoral success over the years. The Roma citizens on the other hand, which are the second biggest ethnic minority in Bulgaria, are at a standstill in terms of party representation. The main research question of this paper is evaluating if EU membership and/or the size of the ethnicities, which are factors where the counties differ, have contributed to the political success and failure of the analyzed ethnic minority parties and ethnicities.

Literature Review

Ethnic identity can play a relevant role in the type of vote within ethnically diverse democracies. Whether ethnic based parties are fruitful for democracies has been a debated issue. Horowitz (2000) and Reilly (2003) make a case against such parties by arguing that they tend to divide the society even further and they see all the political issues from an ethnic lens or are unconcerned with issues which are not directly targeting them or their constituencies. Proponents of ethnic based parties in contrast (Stroschein, 2001; Kymlicka 2001), argue that they are a legitimate part of democratic politics and that they do not cause social division, but simply reflect it. They generate the need for negotiations and compromise via an institutional channel (the Parliament), rather than informally via violence.

The success or failure of ethnic parties, particularly in new, unconsolidated or newly consolidated democracies have been explained as the product of a few factors by the
academia. According to Spirova (2004), constitutional provisions and electoral legislation are the most common tools of state policy that can influence their success or failure. Institutionalists such as Lijphart (1999), argue that a proper electoral system and electoral rules are essential for small parties to succeed, including ones who represent ethnic minorities. The author claims that consensual democracies, which include a Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system, are the best fit for newly established democracies. A PR system, with a low electoral threshold and/or reserved seats for minorities, is relevant for development of the party system, especially in countries with large social cleavages. Raymond, Huelshoff and Rosenblum (2015) argue that party development has a learning curve, meaning that emerging democracies require time and multiple elections in order for parties and voters to find each other and create party fragmentation with a suitable electoral system. Ethnicity is further considered as a useful marker for elites, when they look for voters and potential party coalitions (Bates, 1983; Horowitz, 1985; Chandra, 2004; Posner, 2004; Posner, 2005.) Spirova also performs a comparative study of Romania and Bulgaria, as the most extreme cases in regards to their electoral rules and treatment of ethnic minority parties, with Romania being generous, while Bulgaria restrictive. The author finds that the “positive discrimination” within the electoral arrangement can have an effect if it is supported by the size of the minority and if it is politically dynamic. The ethnic Turks and Roma in Bulgaria as well as the Hungarians and Roma in Romania were the adequate cases for the author’s argument.

In the field of Europeanization, academics such as Spirova (2015) performs research on candidate countries and member states in Eastern Europe and concludes that ethnic-minority parties are more EU-enthusiastic than mainstream parties. They also treat the EP elections as a more important electoral arena than mainstream political parties and use it to further pursue their ethnic agenda. “The European Parliament (EP) elections, for example, provides a new arena in which ethnic minority parties can participate, gain visibility, and advance minority-related agendas (Spirova, 2012, :76).” Most studies view the EU as an agent of change in the area of minority protection and minority rights which is especially effective where ethnic minority parties are part of the governing coalition (Toggenburg, 2004). Spirova (2015) further argues that constitutional provisions and electoral legislation are the most common instruments of state policy that can influence the success or failure of ethnic parties. This in turn, can have a
toll on the party’s capacity to mobilize its electorate, if it has institutional limits, such as constitutional bans on ethnic parties, and the outcome would be a relatively small electorate, hence, lack of success.

**Theoretical framework**

Since the cases of our study are similar in the section of institutional arrangements, i.e. they both have imposed a similar hostile surrounding for small ethnic based parties, even though the outcome of both countries are in contrast to each other, we challenge the institutionalist theory, according to which the type and nature of the political and electoral system is the decisive factor for the success or failure of ethnic minority parties.

We build our research on the theory which focuses on EU integration and how it affects the party politics in newly accessed member states, as well as theory on the institutional arrangements that can have a toll on the success of smaller parties, which in our case are the ethnic minority ones. The second theoretical framework upon which we rely is that size matters. Basically, the size of an ethnic minority when compared to the ethnic majority and the rest of the ethnic minorities plays a role, if not an essential role that determines to what extent the ethnicity in question would be represented by parties and institutions.

**Argument**

In the first hypothesis, we argue that the EU membership is a crucial factor for success of ethnic minority parties. The basis of this argument are the Copenhagen criteria, which entail respect for and protection of minorities. This gives the state an incentive to provide a good environment for ethnic minorities and their representation. Secondly, EU membership means parties can compete in EP elections as well. Due to the electoral system which is friendly towards smaller parties, as well as the parties getting a second arena where they can pursue the interests of their ethnicities, the likelihood of success would increase as an outcome.

The second hypothesis is based on the argument that a larger potential electorate leads to more votes. If the ethnic political party has a large ethnicity to which it could appeal, and the state is dealing with a large proportion of its population, those factors lead to
an increase likelihood of success for the ethnic minority party. According to this hypothesis, ethnic parties ought to be “lucky enough” to represent a large ethnic minority within a state, meaning their strategy should include first and foremost a mobilization of the electorate. The causal chains of both hypotheses are presented below:

**Causal Chain**

H1: Copenhagen Criteria (Protection of ethnic minorities) $\rightarrow$ EU Accession $\rightarrow$ two arenas where interests can be represented (EP and national elections) $\rightarrow$ greater likelihood of success for smaller parties in EP elections $\rightarrow$ larger success of ethnic minority parties

H2: Larger size of the ethnic minority $\rightarrow$ larger electorate for the ethnic minority party $\rightarrow$ larger success of ethnic minority parties

From this causal chain, we derive the respective hypotheses and their variables:

H1: EU membership increases the likelihood of success for ethnic minority parties.

H2: Larger size of the ethnicity increases the likelihood of success for ethnic minority parties.

IV1: EU Membership

IV2: Size of the ethnic minority

DV: Success of ethnic minority parties

**Empirical Research Strategy**

**Research Design**

The research consists of a comparative case study of two cases: the Albanian and the Bulgarian state. The research method is qualitative, where the level of analysis is country level, while the unit of analysis is an ethnic party.

As for the research design, I will apply the most similar case design (Mill’s method of difference), which implies that both cases have similarities, but differ in one aspect, which might be the effect or the cause of the phenomenon. In our two cases, there are two differences, hence, two hypotheses. The EU membership and/or the size of the
ethnic minority may be the cause of success for an ethnic minority party or the lack of it. The hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, implying that one can have an effect on the dependent variable as much as the other. The casualty of the study is probabilistic. The design is Y-centered, meaning that we aim to explain the dependent variable (Y) with as much as X as possible, in this case with 2 possible explanatory variables. Applying Mill’s method of difference when choosing the cases for this research secures the internal validity issue. As for external validity, it has its limits due to the specific features of both countries, as well as the EU element, which is known for its “sui generis.” If the hypotheses hold, it can apply to the other countries of the region, which have multiple similarities with each other, as well for the most part of other post-communist countries which have or are transitioning towards a democratic setting and are ethnically diverse.

Two-way casualty: An endogeneity effect is highly unlikely in the first hypothesis, because the success of ethnic minority parties cannot be the cause of accession in the EU. It can be a factor, but not the main cause, as the Copenhagen criteria encompasses numerous other criteria required for accession. As for the second hypothesis, there is a chance of an endogenous effect if we consider that mobilization strategies of ethnic minority parties can induce citizens belonging to an ethnic minority to start declaring themselves as such formally, and as a result the size of the ethnicity to modify on paper (during the performance of a census). A strong party strategy of an ethnic party may also provide incentives for migration which could also increase its size, but for their success to be that influential, the state would need to provide a good environment, which in this case it does not, compared to other countries which are more ethnic minority-friendly. The lack of success of ethnic minority parties can also have a decreasing effect on the size of the ethnic minority on paper, by not providing a good incentive for ethnicities to declare themselves as belonging to a minority during a census. This however, can be managed if there is a graph on the mother tongue, which indirectly indicates the ethnic origin.

**Concept Specification**

Ethnic Minority: Ethnicity is a broad concept that has been defined differently by academics. Some have overlapped it with language, culture and/or religion. In our research we will use Chandra’s definition, which does not focus on which category of citizens is
included in the ethnic group, but whether an ethnicity or ethnicities are excluded. If it encompasses less than 50 percent of the population, the ethnicity is considered as a minority, hence, the range can vary from 0 to 49 percent. In our cases, the relevant minorities are the Turks and Roma in Bulgaria, and the Greeks in Albania.

Ethnic Minority Party: Chandra (2011) defines an ethnic party as a party that is a champion of the particular interests of one ethnic category or set of categories. The three key aspects of an ethnic party as defined here are the ‘particularity’, the ‘centrality’ and the ‘temporality’ of the interests it champions. By ‘particularity’ Chandra implies that an ethnic party as defined here must always exclude some group - implicitly or explicitly. By arguing that the representation of the interests of some ethnic groups is central to the signals a party sends, this definition rules out parties that make only peripheral references to ethnic categories. Chandra (2011) provides multiple criteria according to which we can detect an ethnic party. The one that we will use is the ethnic leadership criteria, according to which if the party leader declares him/herself as part of a specific ethnicity which is not the majority, it implies that the party represents that particular ethnic minority.

**Operationalization of variables**

EU Membership: A country which is a member of the European Union. The range varies from being a member state to being a non-member state of the EU. In these cases, Bulgaria, which got accession in 2007, is a member state, while Albania is not.

Size of the Ethnic Minority: The size of each ethnicity will be measured according to the official censuses that have been performed in each country. Bulgaria has performed censuses since 1900, while the last one was performed in 2017, while Albania has performed them since 1945, with the last one being in 2011. In the census, citizens are being asked to declare their nationality, which is what is relevant for us in this research. The censuses that are considered by the international arena as illegitimate, will be taken into consideration, due to lack of other official available data on demographics that encompasses multiple years. It is measured in percentages, while the range varies from 0 percent to 100 percent. Data from the Institute of Statistics in Albania and the National Statistics Institute of Bulgaria is used for measurement of this variable.
Success of Ethnic Minority Parties: Success can have multiple meanings, but in this case it is measured by the number of votes that the party has achieved in national elections and in the case of Bulgaria - EP elections as well. If the number of votes are rising over the years, it would imply that their success is rising and vice versa. The range varies from zero votes to all votes from the electoral turnout. Data from Global Elections Database is used as a measurement for this variable.

Analysis

Albania and Bulgaria have multiple similarities regarding history, the political and electoral system, the socio-economic structure, the ethnic structure and their approach to ethnic minorities. Both are post-communist states who have transitioned from an authoritarian rule to a democratic one, they have a strong legislative body, even though Bulgaria is considered to have a semi-presidential political system. Bulgaria has an electoral system consisting of proportional representation, while Albania exchanged it for a mixed one since 2008, where 100 members were elected directly in single member constituencies with approximately equal number of voters while 40 are elected from multi-name lists of parties or party coalitions according to their ranking. Bulgaria’s electoral threshold is at 4% while in Albania it is at 3%. The relevant similarities for this research is the segment of ethnic minorities and how they are being represented. Albania is considered to have six ethnic minorities while Bulgaria has twelve. According to their last censuses, 85% of citizens of Bulgaria have declared themselves as Bulgarians in the ethnicity graph, while 82% in Albania have declared themselves as ethnic Albanians. This implies that both countries have ethnic minorities living within their territory and a roughly equal size of the ethnic majority. Regarding their representation, both countries have similar laws for ethnic parties. Albania has enacted a law for political parties in 1991, which forbids the formation of political parties on an ethnic, religious and regional basis. Bulgaria has enacted a similar law whose basis was to ban ethnic parties. These laws did not completely serve its purpose, since both countries have ethnic minority parties competing in elections. Even though they are not registered as ethnic on paper, they are very much ethnic in practice. The success of the ethnic minority parties of both states varies.

Where they part ways is on EU membership and the size of ethnic minorities. Bulgaria got accession in the EU in 2007, while Albania still has a status of a candidate country.
As for the size of their respective ethnic minorities, even though the overall percentage of the majority in both countries is something over 80%, Bulgaria has ethnic minorities that are larger in size than that of Albania. These two differences are analyzed whether they attribute to the success of ethnic minority parties or the lack of it.

**Ethnic Minorities in Albania and Bulgaria**

**Albania**

The biggest minority in Albania is the Greek minority. It is concentrated in the south of the country, along the border with Greece, an area referred to by Greeks as “Northern Epirus”. The largest concentration is in the districts of Sarandë, Gjirokastër (especially in the area of Dropull), Delvinë and in Himara (part of the district of Vlorë). According to the census performed in 2011, 0.87% (24,243) of the population declared themselves as Ethnic Greeks. The size of the ethnicity has gone through a sharp decrease since the first conducted census in 1945, where they have not been counted in the censuses in 1991 and 2001 (see Figure 1). The other ethnicities include Roma, Aromanians, Macedonians, Balkan Egyptians, Serbian-Montenegrins and other. The size of each ethnicity is less than 10,000 citizens according to the census of 2011. According to the censuses from 1945 onwards, most of the ethnicities have also experienced a constant decrease, while some such as the Roma, Aromanians and the Balkan Egyptians, have not been counted until the last census. It is relevant to mention, that at the 2011 census a total of 390,938 (14% of the total population) did not declare their nationality, while another 44,144 (1.6%) considered the nationality as ‘not relevant’. The census is regarded as unreliable and inaccurate by the Council of Europe. The fact that a whole 14% did not declare their nationality may imply that the existing ethnic minorities in Albania are larger in size than they are officially registered. Also, it might be an indicator for the state’s behavior towards ethnic minorities, by not providing an incentive for the citizens to declare their ethnicity. Both Albania and Greece have different versions on the size of the ethnic minority, with Greece claiming the real numbers are larger than the official ones. According to Berxholli, Protopapa & Prifti (2007), Greece’s claim is based on counting multiple different ethnicities as Greeks due to their common Orthodox religion.
The largest minority in size in Bulgaria is comprised of ethnic Turks. They are concentrated in 9 administrative regions in Bulgaria and constitute about 9% (588,318) of the population according to the census of 2011. Over the years they have also experienced a mild decrease in size, but they are still an objectively largely ethnic minority within the country (see Figure 2). The second largest minority is constituted by the Roma people. They are quite dispersed across the country and have experienced a steady rise across the years, according to the censuses conducted from 1900 until 2011 (see Figure 3). Other minorities consist of Russians, Armenians, Vlachs, Sarakatsani, Macedonians, Greeks, Jews, Romanians, Tatars, Gagauzes and others.

Even though there is variance in the size of the ethnic minorities in both countries, there is a vivid difference in the incentive to declare one’s ethnicity. This argument is supported by the difference in numbers of people who have refused to declare their ethnicity in the censuses. Namely, 10% of the population in Bulgaria did not declare their ethnicity in the 2011 census, while in the case of Albania, it was 14 percent. This may indicate the existence of ethnicities which are not registered or an indication for ethnicities larger than they are officially registered. Regardless, there is a relevant difference in official size of the biggest ethnic minorities in the analyzed cases (see Figure 4).
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Figure 2: Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria

Figure 3: Roma in Bulgaria

Figure 4: Ethnic Greeks in Albania and Ethnic Turks in Albania
Ethnic Minority Parties in Albania and Bulgaria

Albania

The Greek minority in Albania is represented by the political and social organization “OMONIA” which fielded the political party called “The Party of the Union of Human Rights” (PUHR), during the 1992 elections. The party leader is Vangjel Dule, who was born in Gjirokastra, where ethnic Greeks are densely located, declares himself as an ethnic Greek. In the elections of March 22, 1992, the Greek party PUHR received a total of 48,923 votes or 2.9% of the total votes cast in Albania. Those votes secured two seats in the Albanian parliament and are occupied by two Greek nationals representing the PUHR. It is interesting that the census in 1989 counted 1.82% of the population as ethnic Greeks, while PUHR won 2.9% of votes in 1992. Bearing in mind that this does not include underage people, and that the turnout of ethnic Greeks cannot be 100%, the results are conflicting. Berxholli, Protopapa and Prifti (2007) justify this by claiming that non-Greeks voted for PUHR out of economic incentives provided by the Greek government if they vote for PUHR. Seven other legislative elections followed afterwards, with some relevant increase of votes in 1996 and 2005, leading to only 0.14% of votes in the last elections in 2017. After its peak in terms of winning seats in the Parliament in 1997 (4 seats), it gradually decreased to only 1 seat in the 2009 elections, leading up to joining the Democratic Party in the 2017 elections and winning 1 seat. Nevertheless, it can be noticed that as the official records detected less and less ethnic Greeks in the census, the party got less and less votes in each election (see Figure 5).

![Popular vote for PUHR in legislative elections](image-url)

*Figure 5: Popular vote for PUHR in parliamentary elections*
Bulgaria

Bulgaria also has a constitutional ban on ethnic parties, but that did not decrease the presence of ethnic parties effectively. They have maintained a stable position in the political system while not officially registering as an ethnic party. There is more than one minority ethnic party, but the most prominent one is the Movement of Rights and Freedoms (DPS). The Turkish-dominated Movement of Right and Freedoms (DPS) was founded officially in the early 1990s. Its current leader is Mustafa Karadayi, who declares himself as an ethnic Turk. Although it does not have an openly stated ethnic platform by including ethnic Bulgarians in both its membership and its leadership, it represents the interests of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria and its support is concentrated heavily in the region populated by the minority. It gained a consistent share of the votes throughout the 1990s and has been present in all legislatures (Kumanov, 1999:134). Its support was considered instrumental for the changes of governments during 1991-1994. Since 2001 the DPS has been an official coalition partner in the Bulgarian government (Harper 2003:339).

DPS has earned a gradual increase of votes over the course of 9 legislative national elections, with a decrease in the last one in 2017 (see Figure 6).

![Popular vote for DPS in legislative elections](image)

*Figure 6: Popular vote for DPS in legislative elections*

The difference between DPS and PUHR is not only in the size of the electorate, but also in the electoral arenas where they compete. Namely, the DPS has participated in the EP elections in 2007 (the one which is conducted after a country’s accession in the EU)
and the regular elections in 2009, 2014 and 2019. The EP election campaign has turned out to be profitable for DPS, which can pursue the interests of the ethnic minorities on another platform, that happens to be institutionally friendly towards small parties. According to the election results, the DPS has earned a larger share of the electorate votes in the EP elections, (see Figure 7).

![Figure 7: National and EP elections in Bulgaria](image_url)

Even though the DPS has managed to not only survive, but thrive as an ethnic party, despite the constitutional ban and the neutral electoral rules that do not provide benefits for ethnic minority parties or small parties in general, the second largest ethnic minority - the Roma, did not experience the same path. Spirova (2004) argues that the reason for the lack of success of Roma parties is the size of the minority, which is 4%. This is the electoral threshold for earning a seat, as well as the heterogeneous nature of the Roma ethnicity and the inability to mobilize the electorate as a consequence. The Roma parties have struggled over the years with the constitutional ban of ethnic parties in Bulgaria, as well as the electoral threshold. They have gained some success in local elections by getting 3 Roma mayors and over 60 councilors elected (Spirova, 2004:18). As far as the national legislative elections are concerned, the Roma population has been mostly represented by including Roma MPs within mainstream parties, or by joining coalitions with other parties. The multiple Roma parties that competed sometimes together and sometimes against each other, divided the electorate and experienced a lack of success. They also haven’t had any significant success on both national and EP elections after Bulgaria’s accession in the EU.
When we compare the percentage of popular votes for ethnic minority parties across the years in Bulgaria and Albania, we can detect a gradual decrease in Albania, and a gradual increase in Bulgaria. Even though in both cases, the sizes of the ethnicities have decreased over the years, the outcome is different (see Figure 8).

![Percentage of popular vote for ethnic minority parties](image)

*Figure 8: Popular vote for ethnic minority parties in Albania and Bulgaria*

**Conclusion**

Our main hypotheses claims that a larger size of the ethnicity to whom the ethnic party aims to appeal and/or EU membership affects the success or failure of the party. With the comparative analysis of these two cases - Albania and Bulgaria, their biggest ethnic minorities (Turks and Roma in the case of Bulgaria and Greeks in the case of Albania), and the respective parties representing these ethnicities, a few conclusions can be carried out. For the first hypothesis, an EU membership has brought noticeable success for DPS due to the second arena where the party can and does compete successfully. However, the membership did not have an effect on the Roma parties, which have continued to struggle to mobilize the electorate after the accession as much as they did before the accession. This implies that we cannot accept nor reject the first hypothesis completely. What can be established, is that small ethnic parties have a chance of increasing their success once the country enters the EU, as long as they have already reached some level of success before the accession. The reason for this success can be looked into, whether the conditionality for accession, which is protection and representation of minorities had something to do with it, or the party reached success by itself via mobiliza-
tion. Nevertheless, popularity and success on national elections is still a relevant condition for further success in the EP elections. Therefore, we can conclude that the first hypothesis can be accepted if we add an antecedent variable, namely the above-mentioned factor on being already established and known on national legislative elections.

As for the second hypothesis, it is obvious that the constant decrease of the already relatively small size of ethnic Greeks (officially), has imposed a challenge for the ethnic minority party. The size of the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria has also experienced a gradual decrease, but the size is still objectively too large to be ignored. Yet, the situation with the Roma population imposes a limit on this hypothesis, since their numbers are constantly rising and yet electoral success is at a standstill. According to the last census (4.9 %), the size of the ethnicity has already surpassed the 4 % threshold. It seems that the mobilization capacity of the parties plays a relevant and parallel role alongside the size or the success of an ethnic party. The EU membership could be the reason for the gradual increase of registered Roma in censuses over the years, however, the conditionality factor has not played a relevant role in the case of Albania, as we see a gradual decrease of registered Greeks in the performed censuses. Due to these factors, we cannot accept the second hypothesis fully as well.

Other than the mobilization aspect, the countries’ Constitution preambles may have had an institutional effect that “sealed the deal” on ethnicities and their representation. The constitutional ban on ethnic parties and the neutral electoral approach is common for both states, however, there are noticeable differences in the preambles. The Bulgarian Preamble states: "We, the Members of the Seventh Grand National Assembly, guided by our desire to express the will of the people of Bulgaria, by pledging our loyalty to the universal human values of liberty, peace, humanism, equality, justice and tolerance; by holding the rights, dignity and security of the individual as the highest principle; in awareness of our irrevocable duty to guard the national and the state integrity of Bulgaria, hereby proclaim our resolve to create a democratic and social state, governed by the rule of law, by establishing this Constitution". The Albanian on the other hand states: "We, the people of Albania, proud and aware of our history, with responsibility for the future, and with faith in God and/or other universal values, with determination to build a social and democratic state based on the rule of law, and to guarantee the fundamental human rights and freedoms, with a spirit of religious coexistence and tolerance, with a pledge to protect human dignity and personhood, as well as for the pros-
perity of the whole nation, for peace, well-being, culture and social solidarity, with the centuries-old aspiration of the Albanian people for national identity and unity, with a deep conviction that justice, peace, harmony and cooperation between nations are among the highest values of humanity”. It can be observed that the Bulgarian Constitution refers to the citizens as “people” of Bulgaria, while the Albanian one focuses on the nation, the national identity, unity and refers to its citizens as “Albanian People”.

For future research, it should be looked into whether constitutional and institutional beginnings such as these have set the pillars which would cause path dependency for all parties in the future and make the job easier for some, or harder for others.

**References**


